An aged document titled Culliton v. Chase 1933
The explainer · 12-minute read

How Washington banned the income tax: the 93-year wall from Parmenter to ESSB 6346.

Eight bricks. Three of them stacked in 1933. One word, everything, doing all the work.

The short version

Washington's constitution requires every kind of property to be taxed at one uniform rate. In 1933, in Culliton v. Chase, the state Supreme Court ruled 5–4 that income is property. That single ruling is why Washington has no graduated income tax and one of the most unique tax structures in the country.

But Culliton isn't a standalone ruling. It's the keystone brick in a wall built from eight rulings, amendments, and statutes between 1908 and 2026. Pull out any brick and the wall wobbles. That's what makes this story, and the 2026 court, worth paying attention to.

Brick 1 — State ex rel. Wolfe v. Parmenter (1908) source

An obscure debt-collection case. The court ruled that money owed becomes property the instant it is received. At the time, nobody noticed. Twenty-five years later, the Culliton majority would cite it as Exhibit A.

Brick 2 — Aberdeen Sav. & Loan v. Chase (June 1930) source

Washington's legislature had imposed a tax on the "net income" of savings and loans. The court struck it down, ruling that a tax on net income IS a property tax regardless of what the legislature labels it. Substance over label. This is the rule that will reappear, in different costumes, for the next 96 years.

Brick 3 — The 14th Amendment (November 1930) source

Here's where it gets ironic. Washington's farmers — organized through the Grange — had been getting hammered by property taxes on their land while railroad bonds, bank stocks, and other intangible wealth went untaxed. They pushed through a constitutional amendment that redefined "property" to mean:

"Everything, whether tangible or intangible, subject to ownership."

— Washington Constitution, 14th Amendment, ratified November 1930

The Grange wanted that word "everything" to capture intangible wealth so it could finally be taxed. Three years later, the Supreme Court turned that word against them.

Brick 4 — Culliton v. Chase (September 8, 1933) — THE KEYSTONE source

The legislature passed a graduated income tax with overwhelming voter support (70% in a 1932 referendum). The court struck it down 5–4. Justice Oscar Holcomb wrote for the majority:

"It would certainly defy the ingenuity of the most profound lexicographer to formulate a more comprehensive definition of property. It is everything, whether tangible or intangible, subject to ownership. Income is either property under our fourteenth amendment, or no one owns it."

— Justice Oscar Holcomb, Culliton v. Chase, 174 Wash. 363 (1933)

The Grange's word — everything — was used to prove that income is property, which meant a graduated income tax violated the uniformity clause. The farmers' constitutional weapon had become the shield around the rich.

It was 5–4. Change one vote and the next 93 years of Washington tax policy looks completely different.

Brick 5 — State ex rel. Stiner v. Yelle (same day) source

Hours after killing the income tax, the court upheld a business-and-occupation excise tax. The logic: an excise on the privilege of doing business is different from a property tax, even if it's measured by gross income.

This is the door the legislature has been trying to squeeze every income tax through ever since. It's how Washington's B&O tax survives. It's how the 2021 capital gains tax got upheld. And it's the door ESSB 6346, now pending before the court, is trying to walk through.

Brick 6 — Jensen v. Henneford (1936) source

Three years after Culliton, the legislature tried again. This time they labeled it an "excise on the privilege of receiving income," a deliberate attempt to use the Stiner door. The court wasn't fooled. Jensen struck it down and explicitly held that you can't dodge Culliton just by renaming an income tax an excise on income.

This is the brick to pay attention to. Jensen is the precedent that does the most direct work against ESSB 6346.

Brick 7 — Quinn v. State (March 2023) source

Washington's 7% capital gains tax. Opponents argued it was an income tax in excise clothing, straight Jensen territory. The court upheld it 7–2 by ruling it was a tax on the sale or exchange of capital assets, not on income itself. It was a transactional excise, like a real-estate excise tax.

Critically, the court declined to revisit Culliton. The 1933 rule survived intact. The capital gains tax fit through the Stiner door because the taxable event was a discrete transaction, not "receipt of income."

Brick 8 — ESSB 6346 (signed March 2026, pending before the court) source

Passed by the legislature and signed by Gov. Ferguson in March 2026: a 9.9% tax on income over $1 million per year, labeled an "excise on the receipt of income." The constitutional challenge is now pending before the Washington Supreme Court.

That phrase is a near-direct synonym of the language in the 1935 statute that Jensen struck down. The taxable event isn't a transaction, it's just receiving income. There's no Quinn-style sale or exchange. To uphold ESSB 6346, the court has to either distinguish Jensen on weak grounds or finally overrule Culliton.

That's what's on the table. That's why the 2026 court matters.

So why is the politics so confusing?

On most questions, you can guess where a judge will land by looking at endorsements. On this one, the usual map is flipped.

Likely to keep the wall

Candidates who oppose a state income tax. Most Republican-aligned candidates, anti-tax groups, and textualist judges who'd read the 14th Amendment the way the 1933 majority did. The wall is what's protecting their preferred policy outcome.

Likely to knock it down

Candidates who think Washington's tax system is broken and want progressive revenue. Typically: Democratic appointees, civil rights lawyers, judges with a record of revisiting bad precedent. Overturning Culliton, or distinguishing Jensen aggressively, is the path to the tax structure they want.

So a candidate who is conservative on criminal justice or property rights might still favor preserving Culliton. And a candidate who's liberal on civil rights might be the one pushing to overturn it. The party labels don't carry over neatly.

That's the cases. For how we read each candidate against this question — and what this guide is and isn't trying to do — see the About page. Or go meet the candidates →